Quigley''s history of WW II, particularly in China, is instructive for how the rest of his book should be regarded. He repeats the Establishment line involving Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists: Chiang was inept, petty, and passive with regard to the Japanese, fostering...
Quigley''s history of WW II, particularly in China, is instructive for how the rest of his book should be regarded. He repeats the Establishment line involving Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists: Chiang was inept, petty, and passive with regard to the Japanese, fostering a regime of corruption that made it impossible to effectively work with his government to fight the Communists. In Quigley''s China narrative, no where does he mention the Davies group, led by communist sympathizer John Davies. Davies was fluent in Mandarin and knew several high ranking Communists, visiting often with Chou En-lai and relaying the latter''s critical assessments of Chiang to Gen. Stilwell and Washington DC, often without any verification of what Chou En-lai claimed to be true.
Nor does Quigley evaluate Stilwell''s (at best) "peculiar" strategic decisions regarding how to maintain supply lines to the Nationalists or mention Stilwell''s Burma catastrophe, all of which served to handicap Chiang''s efforts to defeat the Japanese while dealing with the Communists. In this regard, Quigley refuses to admit that Chiang kept the Japanese pinned down in China, allowing for Allied forces to concentrate their efforts elsewhere. After the war, Quigley''s narrative is particularly noteworthy for its duplicity and mendacity with regard to Gen. Marshall.
Marshall consistently interfered with military support efforts to Chiang''s government. Particularly during 1946 and early on in 1947, when the Nationalists experienced great success against Mao''s forces, Marshall found ways to put the breaks on Nationalists efforts. As ammunition and military supplies and equipment began to fail and fall into short supply, Marshall blocked shipments of needed supplies, while ignoring Soviet aid and assistance to Mao. In 1948, after receiving unwanted scrutiny from Congress, Marshall oversaw the shipment of guns to Nationalist forces. They were priced exorbitantly high and arrived with their bolts and firing pins missing, all at a critical juncture for Nationalists forces barely hanging on. When Congressman Judd confronted Marshall on his duplicity and nefarious actions, Marshall obfuscated, requesting that his testimony not be made public.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the US effort in China during this time is Marshall''s plan to create a Red West Point to use US military advisors to train Communist forces -- in 1946. Marshall wanted to train Red Forces, to supply them, and to downsize Nationalist Forces before trying to integrate them. This plan was approved by Dean Acheson, though it never came to fruition. In the end, Marshall (and Acheson) consistently aided Communist efforts while throwing up road block after road block against Nationalist forces. Was Marshall -- or Stilwell -- a communist? Not likely. But at least Marshall may have been part of an Establishment that wanted to destroy whatever was left of "the old world" in preparation for what we would now characterize as "a great reset." The consequences of Marshall''s actions are with us today.
Given Quigley''s self-serving omissions regarding how globalist / Establishment interests "lost China," it''s hard to trust much of what he says elsewhere. Ironically, if Quigley can be said to have a political philosophy at all, it''s not that of Hobbes or Machiavelli but that of Carl Schmitt: He is the Sovereign who decides on the exception --